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SUMMARIES 
This paper studies the background to and content 
of George Peacock's work on symbolical algebra. It 
argues that, in response to the problem of the neqa- 
tive numbers, Peacock, an inveterate reformer, elabo- 
rated a system of algebra which admitted essentially 
"arbitrary" symbols, signs, and laws. Although he 
recognized that the symbolical algebraist was free to 
assign somewhat arbitrarily the laws of symbolical 
algebra, Peacock himself did not exercise the free- 
dom of algebra which he proclaimed. The paper ends 
with a discussion of Sir William Rowan Hamilton's 
criticism of symbolical algebra. 
Cet article traite du fond et du contenu 
de l'oeuvre de George Peacock sur l'alqsbre symboli- 
que. On y affirme que pour repondre au problgme des 
nombres ngqatifs, Peacock, un rgformateur in&t&6, 
glabora un systbme alqgbrique qui admettait des sym- 
boles, des siqnes, et des lois essentiellement "arbi- 
traires." Tout en reconnaissant que l'alqgbriste peut 
&oncer quelque peu arbitrairement les lois d'une 
alqkbre symbolique, ?eacock ne fit pourtant pas lui- 
meme de la libert6 qu'il rklamait pour l'alqkbre. 
L'article se termine par une discussion de la critique 
que fit William Rowan Hamilton de l'alq&bre symbolique. 
In diesem Aufsatz wird der Hinterqrund und der 
rnhalt von George Peacocks Arbeiten zur symbolischen 
Algebra untersucht. . . Es wird darqelebt, wie Peacock-- 
ein unermudlicher Reformer--als Antwort auf das Prob- 
lem der neqativen Zhlen ein alqebraisches System 
entwickelte, das im wesentlichen "wilkirliche" Symbole, 
Zeichen und Gesetze zuliess. Obqleich er erkannte, dass 
der symbolisch arbeitende Alqebraiker frei ist, in 
qewissem Umfanq die Gesetze der symbolischen Algebra 
willkirlich festzuleqen, nutze Peacock selbst die von 
ihm proklamierte Freiheit der Algebra nicht aus. 
Schliesslich wird noch Sir William Rowan Hamiltons 
Kritik der symbolischen Algebra besprochen. 
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George Peacock (1791-1858) is universally recognized as one 
of the earliest proponents of the symbolical approach to algebra. 
Yet there exists no single article or book to which historians 
of mathematics can turn for a satisfactory interpretation of the 
background to and content of Peacock's major algebraic work. 
Most summaries and evaluations of his algebraic contributions 
are scattered throughout textbooks on the history of mathematics 
and collections of biographies of great mathematicians, which for 
too long have served as the mainstays of the history of mathe- 
matics. Some insightful discussions of various aspects of his 
work are, of course, found in a few specialized sources on the 
history of 19th-century algebra [Nagel 1935, 448-455; Novy 1973, 
190-1941. But these discussions are somewhat narrow since they 
are segments of more comprehensive studies in which Peacock fig- 
ures as but one of many mathematicians involved in the develop- 
ment of modern algebra. 
As contemporary historians begin to mine ever more deeply 
the rich published and unpublished source materials available 
for the study of the development of modern algebra in 19th-cen- 
tury England and Ireland [Hankins 1976, Dubbey 19781, the time 
is ripe for a reexamination of Peacock's contributions thereto. 
An appreciation of the algebraic work of Charles Babbage and 
Sir William Rowan Hamilton, for example, requires an understand- 
ing of Peacock's major ideas. This paper explores the roots and 
content of Peacock's work on the formulation of the symbolical 
approach to algebra. Through a careful study of Peacock's Trea- 
tise on Algebra of 1830, his "Report on the Recent Progress and 
Present State of Certain Branches of Analysis" of 1833, and rel- 
evant secondary materials as well, the author hopes to present 
a coherent interpretation of Peacock's major algebraic work [l]. 
We begin with a few brief remarks on Peacock's life, and 
suggest that he was first of all a reformer, committed not only 
to mathematical, but to religious, academic, and social reform 
as well. Evidence is presented to support the thesis already 
proposed by Ernest Nagel [1935], that Peacock formulated the 
symbolical approach to algebra in order to resolve the problem 
of the negative and imaginary numbers. In view of Peacock's 
standing as one of the earliest British advocates of symbolical 
algebra, the roots of his algebraic work are, to a limited ex- 
tent, the very roots of British modern algebra. Following a 
discussion of the problem of the negative and imaginary numbers 
in late-18th- and early-19th-century England, the paper explains 
that Peacock conceived of his task as nothing less than the con- 
struction of a deductive science of symbolical algebra, with 
first principles sufficient to justify inclusion of the negatives 
and imaginaries. The principal conclusions of the section on 
Peacock's major algebraic ideas are: first, while he clung to 
quantity as the ultimate subject matter of algebra, Peacock 
adopted a basically symbolical approach to algebra, according to 
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which he viewed it as a science of "arbitrary" or undefined sym- 
bols and signs governed by specified laws; and second, he rec- 
ognized that the algebraist was free to assign somewhat arbi- 
trarily the laws of algebra. Peacock usually receives credit 
for formulating the symbolical approach to algebra. However, 
credit for recognizing the freedom of algebra is usually assigned 
to later algebraists, especially to Hamilton, since Peacock, 
motivated by concern for the applicability of symbolical algebra, 
chose to adopt the laws of arithmetic as the laws of symbolical 
algebra, rather than to create new laws. Ending with a few brief 
remarks about Hamilton's early reaction to Peacock's work, the 
paper indicates the difficulty experienced by Hamilton, clearly 
one of the leading British algebraists of the early 19th century, 
in accepting what he (and probably many of his contemporaries) 
saw as the meaninglessness of symbolical algebra. 
PEACOCK AS A REFORMER 
Peacock was born in 1791 in Denton, in northern England. In 
1808 his father, a minister, sent him to a school run by James 
Tate, a former fellow of Sidney-Sussex College, Cambridge, to 
whom Peacock later dedicated his Treatise on Algebra [1830]. In 
1809 he entered Trinity College, Cambridge, where, four years 
later, placing ahead of all the men of his year who competed for 
honors in mathematics, with the exception of the future astrono- 
mer John Frederick William Herschel, he was named second wran- 
gler and recipient of the second Smith's prize. Elected a fel- 
low of Trinity in 1814, he served successively as college lecturer 
and assistant tutor, full tutor, and sole tutor at Trinity. Be- 
cause of availability of the likes of Babbage and George Airy for 
the few professorships in the mathematical and physical sciences 
at early-19th-century Cambridge, Peacock was not elected to a 
Cambridge professorship until 1837, when he assumed the Lowndean 
professorship of astronomy and geometry. Although he became dean 
of Ely and moved from Cambridge in 1839, he continued to hold the 
Lowndean professorship as a sinecure until his death in 1858, 
despite the protests of some of his academic colleagues [Anon. 
1858, 7441. 
If any generalization assists the historian in the task of 
making sense out of Peacock's diverse activities it is that 
Peacock was above all a reformer--a man who struggled variously 
to improve British calculus and algebra, Cambridge University, 
and sanitation and education in the city of Ely. In 1812, as 
is well known, in his earliest role as a mathematical reformer, 
Peacock collaborated with Babbage and Herschel, then fellow 
undergraduates at Cambridge, in the formation of the Analytical 
Society. Promoting British adoption of the continental notation 
and methods through infiltration of such into the Cambridge mathe- 
matics program, the Society produced in 1816 an English translation 
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of Lacroix's Trait.6 du calcul differentiel et du calcul integral 
and in 1820 A Collection of Examples of the Applications of the 
Differential and Integral Calculus, designed for use by tutors 
in the preparation of students for the mathematical tripos, the 
examination which determined mathematical honors at Cambridge 
[21. Meanwhile, as moderator of the tripos of 1817, Peacock 
posed examination problems in the continental notation. When 
this first official employment of the continental notation at 
Cambridge was criticized, he responded: 
. . . I shall never cease to exert myself to the 
utmost in the cause of reform, and . . . I will never 
decline any office which may increase my power to ef- 
fect it. I am nearly certain of being nominated to the 
office of Moderator in the year 1818-19, and as I am an 
examiner in virtue of my office, for the next year I 
shall pursue a course even more decided than hitherto, 
. . . . It is by silent perseverance only that we can 
hope to reduce the many-headed monster of prejudice, 
and make the University answer her character as the 
loving mother of good learning and science. [In Royal 
Society of London 1859, 538-5391, 
Thus, as early as 1817, Peacock was already a mathematical re- 
former, and verbalized what was to be the theme of his entire 
career--commitment to reform. 
Coupled with his earlier contributions to the improvement of 
the calculus, Peacock's participation in the popular 19th-century 
struggle to reform Cambridge earned him a reputation as "a zeal- 
ous advocate for progress and reform in the university" [Clark, 
5831. Obituaries stressed this theme of his career, according 
to one, he was "all the time . . . an ardent and active politi- 
cian,--a 'Reformer' by temperament and conviction,--one of the 
most consistent adherents of the Whig Party in the University" 
[Anon. 1858, 7431. Peacock merited this reputation through ef- 
forts at change within Cambridge which he exerted individually 
and as a member of two commissions appointed in the 1850s for 
such a purpose. His assault on the nonmathematical traditions of 
Cambridge began at least as early as 1834 when he collaborated 
with Joseph Romilly, Thomas Musgrave, and others in the writing 
of a petition to eliminate the religious examinations which barred 
dissenters from the university [Romilly 1967, 541. Undaunted by 
the rejection of this petition by the House of Lords, he later 
published his Observations on the Statutes of the University of 
Cambridge, in which he explained the content of and suggested 
revisions in the university's laws [Peacock 18411. In the 1850s 
Peacock participated officialy in the reform of Cambriye, as a 
member, first, of a royal commission of inquiry into the university 
and, later, of a parliamentary cornmissIon charged with writing new 
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statutes for the university and its colleges. Partially as a 
result of the latter commission's work, Cambridge abandoned reli- 
gous tests as prerequisites for admission and for the taking of 
all bachelors' degrees with the exception of those in divinity; 
the university's colleges also opened to general competition 
some previously "closed" scholarships and fellowships, which 
had been restricted to "founder's kin" and the like [Barnard 
1963, 1231. Condemning Peacock's work with this commission, some 
of whose proposals were not well received at Cambridge, one of 
his contemporaries accused him of "mere love of change" rather 
the "zeal for improvement" [Anon. 1858, 7451. 
Peacock's efforts on behalf of the continental calculus, re- 
vision of Cambridge's statutes, and sanitary measures in the city 
of Ely show that he was basically a practical reformer. No mere 
visionary, he would do whatever was necessary to further a cause 
in which he believed, no matter how time consuming or unpopular 
the task. For example, as noted above, he assumed the exhausting 
position of moderator of the mathematical tripos and served on 
university committees with controversial charges; as dean of 
Ely, he pushed for a sewerage system in that city despite the 
opposition of some of its leading citizens [Royal Society of 
London 1859, 5411. 
Thus the reforming tendency was a unifying theme which ran 
through Peacock's entire academic and ecclesiastical career. 
Even in his algebraic work (the main topic of this paper), Pea- 
cock was basically a practical reformer. His major contribution 
to modern algebra was a textbook--his Treatise on Algebra of 
1830--in which he developed and explained the symbolical approach 
for the benefit of students of mathematics [Peacock 1830, xxii]. 
It is possible, as John Dubbey has suggested, that some of Pea- 
cock's algebraic ideas were derived from a series of mostly un- 
published essays written by Babbage [Dubbey 1977, 1978, 93-1301 
131. Yet, just as Babbage did not serve as moderator of the 
tripos in order to popularize the continental notation at Cam- 
bridge, so Babbage did not devote his time to writing a textbook 
on symbolical algebra. Rather Peacock--the inveterate practical 
refomnner--did. 
THE PROBLEM OF NEGATIVE NUMBERS 
The roots of Peacock's second major mathematical reform-- 
that of algebra--can be traced back to the attack on negative 
<numbers, waged during the late 18th and early 19th centuries 
by two English mathematicians, Francis Maseres and William Frend. 
Maseres, a fourth wrangler at Clare College, Cambridge, and 
Frend, a second wrangler at Christ's College and later a fellow 
of Jesus College, objected to the use of negative numbers; they 
argued that the want of an adequate definition of such numbers 
rendered algebraic results involving them meaningless and brought 
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into question the very legitimacy of algebra's standing as a 
science. In the 18th century mathematicians defined mathematics 
as the science of quantity, and negative numbers variously as 
"quantities less than nothing" and "quantities obtained by the 
subtraction of a greater quantity from a lesser." Neither def- 
inition was logically satisfying. Furthermore, the latter def- 
inition raised another problem--that of the definition of the 
subtraction operation. As the opponents of the negatives noted, 
algebraists routinely defined subtraction as the taking of a 
lesser from a greater, and so were not free to conduct the opera- 
tion upon which the second definition of a negative depended. 
In lieu of an adequate definition, some mathematicians had tried 
to justify the negatives through analoqy to debts, lines drawn 
in certain directions, and the like [Newton 1728,3]. Dismis- 
sing this approach to justifying the negatives, Frend retorted. 
"when a person cannot explain the principles of a science with- 
out reference to metaphor, the probability is, that he has never 
thought accurately upon the subject" [Frend 1796 1, xl. Because 
of the lack of a satisfactory definition of negative numbers, 
Maseres and Frend looked upon'all work involving these numbers 
as nonsense and maintained that by inclusion of the negatives, 
"the Science of Algebra, or Universal Arithmetick, has been dis- 
graced and rendered obscure and difficult, and disgusting to men 
of a just taste for accurate reasoning" [Maseres 1800, Iv]. 
In order to remedy such defects of late-lath-century algebra, 
Maseres and Frend called for nothing less than the total abandon- 
ment of negative numbers and the restriction, in practice as well 
as definition, of the subtraction operation to cases where the 
minuend was greater than or equal to the subtrahend. These re- 
strictions would reduce algebra to universal arithmetic in the 
strictest sense, that is, to a science where symbols stood only 
for nonnegative numbers and signs denoted strictly arithmetical 
operations. Both Maseres and Frend wrote books developing such 
a truncated version of algebra: among them, Maseres' Disserta- 
tion on the Use of the Negative Sign in Algebra, published in 
1758, and Frend's Principles of Algebra, published in two volumes 
in 1796 and 1799. The very first sentence of the former work an- 
nounced: 
The design of the following Dissertation is to 
remove from some of the less abstruse parts of Alge- 
bra, the difficulties that have arisen therein from 
the too extensive use of the Negative Sign, and to ex- 
plain them, without considering the Negative Sign in 
any other light than as the mark of the subtraction 
of a lesser quantity from a greater. [Maseres 1758, il 
Rejecting negative numbers entailed rejecting imaginary numbers 
and, of course, negative and imaginary roots of equations. Thus 
in his Dissertation, Maseres renounced the theory of equations, 
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which had blossomed during the 17th and 18th centuries and, in 
particular, the fundamental theorem of algebra, which asserts 
the existence of (at least) one complex root of the polynomial 
anxn + . . . + a1x + a.0 = 0, where n >, 1, a, # 0, and the ai are 
complex numbers. Pursuing abandonment of the negatives to its 
logical conclusion, Maseres argued, for example, that an equa- 
tion of the form x2 + bx = r has but one root. He considered the 
following specific case: x2 + 2x = 15. Maseres stated that 
x = 3, a positive root of the equation, was acceptable, but then 
tried to demonstrate the absurdity of admitting the root x = -5. 
He substituted x = -5 into the given equation and, with the help 
of the law of signs, which he also criticized, derived the re- 
lationship 25 - 10 = 15. The latter equation, he claimed, was 
actually an equation of the form x 2 - 2x = 15; in his opinion, 
then, the admission of the negative root, x = -5, resulted in the 
confounding of two distinct equations. Seemingly grasping at 
straws, he summarized: 
This seems to be considering the two equations 
xx + 2x = 15, and xx- 2x = 15, or xx + px = r, and 
xx - px = r (which are so many assertions quite 
distinct from each other, and cannot be derived 
from the conditions of the same problem), as if 
they were one and the same equation:. _ . . This 
method of uniting together two different equations 
may perhaps have its uses; but, I must confess, I 
cannot see them: on the contrary, it should seem 
that perspicuity and accuracy require, that two 
equations, or propositions, that are in their 
nature different from each other, and are the 
results of different conditions and suppositions, 
should be carefully distinguished from each other, 
and treated of separately, each by itself, as it 
comes under consideration. [Maseres 1758, 291 
In short, the crusade of Maseres and Frend against negative numbers 
was a crusade against all algebra beyond universal arithmetic, 
including the valuable theory of equations. 
Although a study of British algebra textbooks and articles 
published in the leading British scientific journals of the late 
18th and early 19th centuries demonstrates that the problem of 
negative numbers was a major concern of British thinkers of the 
period, it also shows that most British mathematicians were reluc- 
tant to renounce the riches of algebra because of foundational 
problems [4]. Although admitting the absence of a satisfactory 
definition of the negatives, most argued in favor of their reten- 
tion, if only because of practical considerations. Thinkers who 
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concurred with Maseres and Frend in recognition of the problem 
but not in their solution included William Greenfield, an amateur 
mathematician and a professor of rhetoric at the University of 
Edinburgh, and Robert Woodhouse, successively a fellow, Lucasian 
professor of mathematics, and Plumian professor of astronomy 
and experimental philosophy at Cambridge. In his address of 
1784 before the Royal Society of Edinburgh, Greenfield admitted 
that 
a complaint remains, which appears to be too well 
founded, that the Method of negative quantities, 
as has been the case with some other rules of the 
art, is supported, rather by induction and analogy, 
than by mathematical demonstration . . . . The very 
vague and unsatisfactory, and often mysterious ac- 
counts of the matter, which are given even by writers 
of the greatest eminence, serve only to shew, that 
although they are satisfied of the certainty of the 
method, yet they perceive that something still re- 
mains which ought to be explained, and of which no 
good explanation has been given. [Greenfield 1788, 
134-1351 
Yet unwilling to support the reduction of algebra to universal 
arithmetic, Greenfield urged algebraists, such as Maseres (whom 
he explicitly mentioned) to "exert . . . industry and ingenuity, 
rather to confirm than to destroy; rather to demonstrate, how 
far we might rely on the method of negative quantities, than to 
overturn at once so great a part of the labours of the modern 
algebraists" [Greenfield 1788, 1361. In a paper read before the 
Royal Society of London in 1801, Woodhouse also took a pragmatic 
approach to the problem. Acknowledging that "an abstract nega- 
tive quantity is indeed unintelligible" [Woodhouse 1801, 961, 
he yet argued for retention of negative and imaginary numbers. 
"If operations with any characters or signs lead to just con- 
clusions," he maintained, "such operations must be true by vir- 
tue of some principle or other" [Woodhouse 1801, 901. 
Greenfield and Woodhouse were joined in their attempt to 
salvage the negative and imaginary numbers by a few mathemati- 
cians, including John Playfair and Adrien-Quentin B&e, whose 
defense of these numbers offered glimpses of a symbolical ap- 
proach to algebra [5]. Nagel has already pointed out that 
Playfair, in his paper "On the Arithmetic of Imposible Quanti- 
ties," "almost guessed the secret of the nature of mathematics" 
[Nagel 1935, 4391. In this paper, Playfair indeed came close 
to recognizing algebra as a science of meaningless symbols: 
In algebra again every magnitude being denoted by an 
artificial symbol, to which it has no resemblance, is 
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liable, on some occasions, to be neglected, while the 
symbol may become the sole object of attention. It 
is not perhaps observed where the connection between 
them ceases to exist, and the analyst continues to 
reason about the characters after nothing is left 
which they can possibly express . [Playfair 1778, 
3191 
Early in the next century, B&e, a French emiq& living in 
London, responded to Frend's Principles of Algebra by suggesting 
that there were two kinds of algebra: (1) "arithm&ique uni ver- 
selle" or universal arithmetic, in which the signs + and - stood 
only for addition and subtraction; and (2) "une langue math& 
matique," or a mathematical language, in which + and - also rep- 
resented what B&e called "qualities." He explained that a qua- 
lity was that which was capable of a meaning or interpretation, 
and a negative number was actually a combination of quantity and 
quality: 
whenever one has as a result of an operation a quantity 
preceded by the sign -, it is necessary, in order that 
the result has a meaning, to consider some quality. 
Then algebra must no longer be regarded simply as a 
universal arithmetic, but as a mathematical language . . . . 
Likewise, when one has said that a negative 
quantity is less than zero, one has once more in 
view this second meaning [+ and - considered as 
qualities rather than as signs of addition and 
subtraction]; because it is not the quantity which 
is less than zero; it is the quality which is infe- 
rior to nullity [inferieure B la nullit&]. For ex- 
ample, if my debts exceed my assets I am poorer than 
if I had neither assets nor debts. [B&e 1806, 25; 
translation is mine] 
Although Buee proposed dividing algebra into two parts, universal 
arithmetic and some sort of mathematical language, and offered a 
geometrical interpretation of the complex numbers as well, his 
contribution to the development of symbolical algebra was other- 
wise minimal. As seen above, he continued to stress meaning in 
algebra, trying to explain the negative numbers through appeal 
to analogy and to the philosophical notion of quality. In his 
Treatise on Algebra Peacock noted that B&e's paper contained 
"some original views on the use and signification of the signs 
of Algebra, though presented in a very vague and unscientific 
form" [Peacock 1830, xxvii] [6]. 
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PEACOCK'S SYMBOLICAL APPROACH TO ALGEBRA 
Along with the work of Greenfield and the other defenders of 
the negatives, Peacock's formulation of the symbolical approach 
to algebra can be seen as a direct response to Maseres' and Frend's 
opposition to negative numbers. In his Treatise on Algebra of 
1830 and "Report" of 1833, he tackled the major problems raised 
by the opponents of the negatives: the status of the negative 
numbers, the definition of the subtraction operation, and the 
question of algebra's standing as a science. In the "Report" he 
referred explicitly to the algebraic ideas of Maseres and Frend 
and quoted rather extensively from Frend's Principles of Algebra, 
admitting that 
the arguments which they [Maseres and Frend] made use 
of were unanswerable, when advanced against the form 
under which the principles of algebra were exhibited 
in the elementary and all other works of that period, 
and which they have continued to retain ever since, 
with very trifling and unimportant alterations. 
[Peacock 1833, 189-1921 
A combination of factors probably aroused and fueled Peacock's 
interest in the problem of negative numbers and its resolution. 
In the early 19th century it would have been difficult for any 
serious English student of mathematics to have escaped contact 
with the problem, so often was it mentioned in the scholarly 
articles and algebra textbooks of the period. In his Treatise 
Peacock noted that B&e's paper of 1806 had initially directed 
his attention to the geometrical interpretation of the complex 
numbers [Peacock 1830 xxvii]. As already indicated, this paper 
also discussed the problem of the negatives, proposing a very 
vague resolution thereof. Furthermore, most major participants 
in the debate over negative numbers were associated with Cam- 
bridge University, where Peacock studied and then taught. Maseres 
and Frend were graduates of Cambridge; FL-end's trial and subse- 
quent banishment in 1793 from Cambridge for his dissenting reli- 
gious and radical political views had become a cause cglkbre at 
the university. Woodhouse was a fellow and professor at Cambridge 
during Peacock's early tenure there. Finally, conscientious as 
a tutor at Trinity, Peacock shared the concern of Woodhouse and 
others for the difficulty students manifested in following alge- 
braic arguments. In the British universities of this period, 
mathematics was, after all, valued not so much for itself, but 
as an instrument for the training of logical minds. Possibly with 
this pedagogical purpose in mind, Woodhouse, in a letter of 1801 
to Maseres, had agreed that "till the doctrines of negative and 
imaginary quantities are better taught than they are at present 
taught in the University of Cambridge, _.. they had better not 
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be taught" (in [De Morgan 1842, 4621). As already noted, Peacock 
himself intended his Treatise on Algebra of 1830 as a textbook 
which made algebra "perfectly accessible" to students [Peacock 
1830, xxii]. 
Influenced by Maseres and Frend, Peacock began his Treatise 
on Algebra of 1830 and "Report" of 1833 with the claim that there 
were within algebra no adequate foundations for the negative 
numbers and the unrestricted subtraction operation and, therefore, 
that algebra's standing as a deductive science was suspect. To- 
gether with the opponents of the negatives, he dismissed the 
popular idea that the principles of arithmetic were also the 
principles of algebra. He pointed out, for example, that it was 
erroneous to maintain that the subtraction operation of algebra 
could be justified by an appeal to that of arithmetic. He noted 
that, although the subtraction operation of algebra had been bor- 
rowed from arithmetic with no statement of any extension in its 
meaning or application, the arithmetical operation was clearly 
limited to those cases in which the minuend was greater than or 
equal to the subtrahend, while the algebraic operation was unre- 
stricted. As he generalized, 
in the exposition of the principles of algebra, arith- 
metic has always been taken for its foundation, and 
the names of the fundamental operations in one science 
have been transferred to the other without any imme- 
diate change of their meaning, yet it has generally 
been found necessary subsequently to enlarge this 
very narrow basis of so very general a science, 
though the reason of the necessity of doing so, and 
the precise point at which, or the extent to which, 
it was done, has usually been passed over without 
notice. The science which was thus formed was per- 
fectly abstract, in whatever manner we arrived at 
its fundamental conclusions; and those conclusions 
were the same whatever view was taken of their ori- 
gin, or in whatever manner they were deduced; but a 
serious error was committed in considering it as a 
science which admitted of strict and rigorous dem- 
onstration, when it certainly possessed no adequate 
principles of its own, whether assumed or demon- 
strated, which could properly justify the character 
which was thus given to it.[Peacock 1833, 188-1891 
While he concurred with Maseres and Frend in diagnosing the 
problems of algebra, Peacock proposed a remedy very different 
from theirs. In order to establish algebra as a science, Maseres 
and Frend had scuttled all questionable algebraic entities and 
reduced algebra to universal arithmetic in the strictest sense. 
Peacock, on the other hand, shared the reluctance of Woodhouse 
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and other defender of the negatives to lose those parts of mathe- 
matics in which the negatives figured, and so sought to construct 
a deductive science of algebra in which the negatives, imaginaries, 
and an unrestricted subtraction operation were preserved. As he 
explained in his "Report," the universal arithmetic of Maseres 
and Frend could not be accepted in place of algebra because 
there were a great multitude of algebraical results and 
propositions, of unquestionable value and of unques- 
tionable consistency with each other, which were ir- 
reconcilable with such a system, or,at all events, not 
deducible from it; and amongst them, the theory of the 
composition of equations, which Harriot had left in so 
complete a form, and which made it necessary to con- 
sider negative and even impossible quantities as hav- 
ing a real existence in algebra, however vain might 
be the attempt to interpret their meaning.[Peacock 
1833, 190-1911 
Because of these pragmatic considerations, Peacock wrote the 
Treatise "with a view of conferring upon Algebra the character 
of a demonstrative science, by making its first principles co- 
extensive with the conclusions which were founded upon them" 
[Peacock 1830, VI. In short, he sought to justify all the con- 
clusions of traditional algebra by rewriting the first principles 
of algebra. 
Basic to Peacock's work on the foundations of algebra was 
his well-known distinction between arithmetical algebra and 
symbolical algebra, which he described as two independent sciences, 
distinguished from one another by the assumption in the latter 
of the existence of the negatives and an unrestricted subtraction 
operation. Arithmetical algebra was universal arithmetic in the 
strictest sense which, as he noted in the "Report," had been clearly 
and logically developed by Frend [Peacock 1833, 1911; symbolical 
algebra, defined variously throughout the Treatise and "Report," 
was above all traditional algebra, that is, algebra including the 
negatives, imaginaries, and unrestricted subtraction operation. 
According to Peacock, the mathematician moved from arithmetical 
to symbolical algebra as follows: 
The assumption . . . of the independent existence of 
the signs + and - . . . renders the performance of 
the operation denoted by - equally possible in all 
cases : and it is this assumption which effects the 
separation of arithmetical and symbolical Algebra, and 
which renders it necessary to establish the principles 
of this science upon a basis of their own: for the 
assumption in question can result from no process of 
reasoning from the principles or operations of Arith- 
metic, and . . . it must be considered therefore as 
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an independent principle, which is suggested as a 
means of evading a difficulty which results from the 
application of arithmetical operations to general 
symbols. [Peacock 1830, viii-ix] 
Alternately, later in the same work, Peacock wrote: 
If, however, we generalize the operation denoted by -, 
so that it may admit of application in all cases, we 
shall then find the independent existence of this sign 
will follow as a necessary consequence, and we shall 
thus introduce a class of quantities, whose existence 
was never contemplated in Arithmetic or Arithmetical 
Algebra. . . . 
This generalization of the operation denoted by 
-I is in reality an assumption, inasmuch as it is not 
a consequence deducible from the operation of subtrac- 
tion as defined and used in Arithmetic and Arithmetical 
Algebra. IPeacock 1830, 70-711 
Although somewhat fuzzy about the relative primacy of the above- 
mentioned assumptions--that of the existence of the independent 
signs + and - and that of the unrestricted subtraction operation-- 
Peacock thus revealed the crux of his solution to the problem 
of negative numbers. The negatives and unrestricted subtraction 
operation arose when arithmetic was treated in the most general 
manner. But there were no arithmetical foundations for either. 
In lieu of such, he now introduced them into algebra by assump- 
tion, without definition or arithmetical justification, as "a 
means of evading a difficulty" [7]. 
Incorporating the assumptions of the existence of the unde- 
fined negatives and of an undefined and unrestricted subtraction 
operation into symbolical algebra required a radical revision of 
the standard notion of algebra as some sort of vague generaliza- 
tion of arithmetic in which symbols were substituted for numbers. 
In place of this notion Peacock defined symbolical algebra as 
"the science which treats of the combinations of arbitrary signs 
and symbols by means of defined though arbitrary laws" [Peacock 
1830, 711. As he explained, algebraic symbols were "arbitrary" 
in the sense that they were "not merely . . . the general repre- 
sentatives of numbers, but of every species of quantity" [Peacock 
1830, ix]. Algebraic signs, such as the independent signs + and 
-I were "arbitrary" since they were also introduced into symboli- 
cal algebra without definition. If, however, the signs of sym- 
bolical algebra were arbitrary, how then were algebraic operations 
to be determined? In his Treatise, Peacock mandated: "the def- 
initions of those operations must regard the laws of their combi- 
nation only" [Peacock 1830, ix]; in the "Report," he explained: 
"In arithmetical algebra, the definitions of the operations deter- 
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mine the rules; in symbolical algebra, the rules determine the 
meaning of the operations, or more properly speaking, they furnish 
the means of interpreting them" [Peacock 1833, 2001. In short, 
in lieu of the definitions of symbols and signs demanded by his 
predecessors, Peacock used laws of combination to determine the 
content of symbolical algebra, thus shifting the emphasis in al- 
gebra from the meaning of symbols and signs to the laws of opera- 
tion. It was this aspect of his work, similar in spirit and ef- 
fect to the introduction into physics during the Scientific Rev- 
olution of concern for the "how" rather than the "why", upon 
which Augustus De Morgan, Duncan F. Gregory, George Boole, and 
other British pioneers of mathematics constructed modern abstract 
algebra during the second third of the 19th century. 
Although symbolical algebra was basically a science of arbi- 
trary or undefined symbols and signs, Peacock explained that inter- 
pretation of algebraic symbols and signs could follow, even if it 
did not precede, algebraic manipulation [Peacock 1833, 1951. The 
negative numbers, for example, were initially meaningless, but 
could admit of many possible, although no necessary, interpreta- 
tions. Peacock cautioned, however, that "it is only by their 
[the symbols'] ceasing to be abstract numbers that we shall be 
enabled to interpret the affections which the signs + and - (or 
any other signs) essentially attached to them may be supposed to 
express" [Peacock 1830, ix]. If an algebraic symbol, say a, stood 
only for an abstract number, then Peacock admitted that -a made no 
sense. (This was, after all, the argument of Maseres and Frend.) 
When, however, such a symbol represented every species of quantity, 
an interpretation for -a could easily be found: if, for example, 
+a was a line drawn in a certain direction, the -a was a line 
drawn in the opposite direction. 
In his discussions of the laws governing algebraic operations 
Peacock enunciated a frequently overlooked restricted version of 
the principle of the freedom of mathematics--that the algebraist 
rather arbitrarily assigns the laws of symbolical algebra. In 
his Treatise and "Report" he had described these laws as "defined 
though arbitrary." In the former work, he also maintained that 
"we may assume any laws for the combination and incorporation of 
such symbols, so long as our assumptions are independent, and 
therefore not inconsistent with each other" [Peacock 1830, 711. 
Reiterating this idea, the "Report" declared: 
in symbolical algebra, the rules determine the meaning 
of the operations . . . . we might call them arbitrary as- 
sumptions, in as much as they are arbitrarily imposed 
upon a science of symbols and their combinations, which 
might be adapted to any other assumed system of consis- 
tent rules. [Peacock 1833, 200-2011 
Since Peacock described the symbols and signs of symbolical al- 
gebra as arbitrary, he would have been hard-pressed to argue that 
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there existed a single necessary set of rules, governing such 
symbols and signs. Instead, as illustrated above, he defended 
the arbitrariness of the laws of symbolical algebra and thus the 
freedom of the algebraist. 
Peacock's declaration that the laws of symbolical algebra 
were assigned rather arbitrarily by mathematicians was almost 
totally ignored, first by his contemporaries and later by histo- 
rians of mathematics, who have usually ascribed recognition of 
the freedom of mathematics to Hamilton, the creator of the quater- 
nions, and to the inventors of non-Euclidean geometry [8]. Pea- 
cock's loss of credit for this idea is partially due to the fact 
that he did not exercise the freedom of algebra which he pro- 
claimed. Rather, because of his concern for the applicability 
of symbolical algebra, he simply adopted the laws of arithmetic 
as the laws of algebra. In both the Treatise and "Report" dec- 
larations of the freedom of algebra were accompanied by state- 
ments of what Peacock saw as the major problem associated with 
the exercise of that freedom--that of the applicability or use- 
fulness of an algebra built upon arbitrary symbols, signs, and 
laws. Thus in the earlier work he pointed out that such an al- 
gebra of arbitrary symbols and signs "must terminate in the con- 
sequences of their laws of combination" [Peacock 1830, xi] and 
expressed the fear that it "may. . . be one of useless and barren 
speculations"[Peacock 1830, 711. In the "Report," he explained 
this problem of applicability as follows: 
If... in the construction of such a system, we 
looked to the assumption of such rules of operation 
or of combination only, as would be sufficient, and 
not more than sufficient, for deducing equivalent 
forms, without any reference to any subordinate 
science, we should be altogether without any means 
of interpreting either our operations or their re- 
sults, and the science thus formed would be one of 
symbols only, admitting of no applications whatever. 
[Peacock 1833, 2001 
Concern for applicability caused Peacock to concentrate less on 
exploration of the essential arbitrariness of the laws of symboli- 
cal algebra than on the selection and defense of such laws as 
would ensure the usefulness of his new algebra. 
The principle of selection of the laws of symbolical algebra 
adopted by Peacock was, of course, the now famous principle of the 
permanence of equivalent forms, according to which the laws of 
arithmetical algebra were adopted as the laws of symbolical al- 
gebra, thus guaranteeing that the latter would be useful at least 
as a generalization of arithmetic. To the enunciation, demon- 
stration, and application of this principle Peacock devoted con- 
siderably more space than to the treatment of the arbitrariness 
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of algebraic laws. As he explained in the Treatise in order to 
avoid creating a science of "useless and barren speculations," 
he decided to "choose some subordinate science as the guide mere 
and not as the foundation of our assumptions, and frame them in 
such a manner that Algebra may become that most general form of 
that science, when the symbols denote the same quantities which 
are the objects of its demonstration" [Peacock 1830, 711. The 
decision to use what Peacock termed a "subordinate science" as 
the "science of suggestion," or that science the laws of which 
suggested those of symbolical algebra, led to his formal state- 
ment of the principle of the permanence of equivalent forms: 
Whatever form is Algebraically equivalent to an- 
other, when expressed in general symbols, must be 
true, whatever those symbols denote. 
Conversely, if we discover an equivalent form in 
Arithmetical Algebra or any other subordinate science, 
when the symbols are general in form though specific 
in their nature, the same must be an equivalent form, 
when the symbols are general in their nature as well 
as in their form. [Peacock 1830, 1041 
As already indicated, Peacock chose arithmetical algebra as the 
science of suggestion for symbolical algebra [1830, 741. Thus 
his adoption of the permanence principle can be seen not only as 
a resolution of the problem of the applicability of symbolical 
algebra, but as a retreat to the standard earlier practice of 
the transference of the laws of arithmetic to algebra. 
While Peacock clearly deserves some credit for recognizing 
the freedom of the symbolical algebraist to assign laws of com- 
bination, the description of Peacock as one of the original for- 
mulators of the principle of the freedom of mathematics must be 
qualified by admission of the following points: (1) he refused 
to exercise the freedom of algebra beyond stating that, as an 
algebraist, he had chosen to assign the laws of arithmetic to 
symbolical algebra; (2) in a few passages in the "Report" and 
the revised edition of the Treatise which appeared in 1842-1845, 
he seemed to abandon the principle of the freedom of algebra and 
to argue that the laws of arithmetic were necessarily the laws 
of algebra; and (3) he clearly believed that an element of free- 
dom was involved in symbolical algebra only, and not in arith- 
metic or geometry. The first point was discussed above. The 
second, I believe, is the main reason why Peacock's recognition 
of the freedom of algebra has been missed by most historians of 
mathematics. 
Put simply, he sometimes wrote as if that freedom did not 
exist. Although his "Report" included the explicit statement of 
-Y , 
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algebraic freedom quoted above, it also referred to a necessary 
connection between the laws of arithmetic and those of symbolical 
algebra: 
But though the science of arithmetic, or of arith- 
metical algebra, does not furnish an adequate founda- 
tion for the science of symbolical algebra, it neces- 
sarily suggests its principles, or rather its laws 
of combination; for in as much as symbolical algebra, 
though arbitrary in the authority of its principles, 
is not arbitrary in their application, being required 
to include arithmetical algebra as well as other 
sciences, it is evident that their rules must be 
identical with each other, as far as those sciences 
proceed together in common. [Peacock 1833, 1951 
Furthermore, in the second and substantially revised edition of 
the Treatise on Algebra, Peacock stated: "I believe that no 
views of the nature of Symbolical Algebra can be correct or philo- 
sophical which made the selection of its rules of combination 
arbitrary and independent of arithmetic" [Peacock 1845 2, 4531. 
These two passages were quoted by Elaine Koppelman as evidence 
that Peacock "insisted that the laws of arithmetic must always 
be valid" in symbolical algebra [Koppelman 1971, 2161. Koppel- 
man's statement is, of course, correct as far as it goes, but 
it should be qualified by recognizing that in the first edition 
of the Treatise and in the "Report," Peacock argued that the 
necessity of adopting arithmetical laws as the laws of symboli- 
cal algebra rested upon the somewhat arbitrary acceptance of 
arithmetical algebra as the science of suggestion for symbolical 
algebra [9]. 
Not only did Peacock stop short of creating arbitrary symboli- 
cal laws--sometimes writing as if he had renounced any idea of 
mathematical freedom--he also restricted this freedom to symboli- 
cal algebra. Arithmetic and geometry, he argued, were based 
upon axioms which were "necessary and self-evident consequences 
of the definitions"; in symbolical algebra, however, there were 
"properly speaking, no axioms, since the propositions, immedi- 
ately deducible from the definitions and assumptions, must be 
considered rather as the necessary and immediate consequences 
of defined operations, than the necessary and self-evident re- 
sults of reasoning" [Peacock 1830, 112-1131. In the "Report" he 
explained: "We are supposed to be in possession of a science 
of arithmetical algebra . . . whose laws of combination are cap- 
able of strict demonstration, without the aid of any principle 
which is not furnished by our knowledge of common arithmetic" 
[Peacock 1833, 2061. Thus, according to Peacock, arithmetic and 
geometry were based upon self-evident, necessary axioms from 
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which were derived the laws of these two sciences. Symbolical 
algebra, on the other hand, was not based on self-evident axioms, 
but on defined operations. The freedom of mathematics, then, was 
exercised only in symbolical algebra, in the definition of its 
operations through assignment of its law of combination. 
NEGATIVE REACTION TO PEACOCK'S SYMBOLICAL APPROACH 
In order to place a scientific development in historical 
perspective, the historian of science must frequently supple- 
ment accounts of the acceptance of the development with accounts 
of its rejection. Thus, in a study of early reaction to Peacock's 
major algebraic work, it is not sufficient to note that De Morgan, 
Gregory, and Boole accepted, with some variations, Peacock's sym- 
bolical approach to algebra. The rejection of the approach by 
Sir William Rowan Hamilton--a brilliant mathematician whose 
contributions to the development of abstract algebra at least 
equaled those of the aforementioned mathematicians--is as inter- 
esting and perhaps as significant as its adoption by these 
others. The story of Hamilton's opposition underscores the rev- 
olutionary nature of Peacock's work, as no account of its accep- 
tance can. 
In a letter of 1835 to John T. Graves, a close friend and 
mathematical correspondent, Hamilton tried to explain his re- 
luctance to join Peacock's school: 
we [Hamilton and Graves] belong to opposite poles in 
Algebra; since you, like Peacock, seem to consider 
Algebra as a "System of Signs and of their combina- 
tions," somewhat analogous to syllogisms expressed in 
letters; while I am never satisfied unless I think 
that I can look beyond or through the signs to the 
things signified. I habitually desire to find or 
make in Algebra a system of demonstrations resting at 
last on intuitions, analogous in some way or other to 
Geometry as presented by Euclid. [Graves 1885 2, 
1431 
Again, about ten years later, Hamilton offered the following 
description of his early negative reaction to Peacock's Treatise 
of 1830: 
When I first read that work . . . and indeed for a 
long time afterwards, it seemed to me, I own . . . that 
the author designed to reduce algebra to a mere system 
of symbols, and nothing more; an affair of pothooks and 
hangers, of black strokes upon white paper, to be made 
according to a fixed but arbitrary set of rules: and 
I refused, in my own mind, to give the high name of 
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Science to the results of such a system; as I should, 
even now, think it a stretch of courtesy, however it 
may be allowed by custom, to speak of chess as a 
"science," though it may well be called a "scientific 
game." [Graves 1885 2, 5281. 
Thus, at least in the 1830s and early 184Os, Hamilton could not 
accept Peacock's modern idea of symbolical algebra as a science 
of basically arbitrary symbols and laws. He clearly desired to 
retreat to the traditional, and what he regarded as the more 
philosophically satisfying, view of algebra as a science of 
meaningful symbols governed by necessary principles stemming 
from intuition. 
Although Hamilton's solution to the problem of the negative 
and imaginary numbers rested on his definition of algebra as the 
science of pure time [Hamilton 18371, his reaction to Peacock's 
symbolical approach should not be dismissed as the eccentric 
view of a mathematician obsessed with metaphysics. Rather it 
should be taken as the thoughtful response of an early-19th- 
century mathematician who was well steeped in traditional mathe- 
matics and so expected all mathematics to be meaningful and nec- 
essary in more than a strictly logical way. In short, his rejec- 
tion of the symbolical approach underscores the novelty of Peacock's 
algebraic work, in which the centuries-old notion of the necessity 
of mathematical principles was abandoned and the notion of the 
arbitrariness of the symbols and laws of algebra introduced. In 
his expression of concern for the direction in which Peacock was 
taking algebra, Hamilton probably spoke for the majority of his 
mathematical contemporaries and certainly for those modern mathe- 
maticians and philosophers of mathematics who still object to an 
approach to algebra which makes it akin to a game, albeit an ex- 
ceptionally fruitful game [lo]. 
On this issue of meaning in mathematics, Hamilton was on the 
losing side; Peacock, on the winning. In the middle third of 
the 19th century De Morgan, Gregory, and Boole adopted and re- 
fined Peacock's symbolical approach to algebra, and in 1843, 
with the invention of the quaternions, Hamilton, somewhat ironi- 
cally, became the first to exercise the freedom of mathematics 
which Peacock had merely proposed. By 1846 even Hamilton was 
willing "to admit that there is a sort of symbolical science, 
or science of language, which well deserves to be studied, ab- 
straction being made for a while of meaning, or interpretation" 
[Graves 1885 2, 5211. In short, Peacock's reforming tendencies, 
directed at an algebra marred by the problem of negative numbers, 
resulted in the formulation of the symbolical approach to alge- 
bra which, capped by Hamilton's work on the quaternions, emerged 
as the modern abstract approach to algebra, clearly the dominant 
approach from the late 19th century through the present. 
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NOTES 
A shorter version of this paper was presented in March 1979 
at the annual meeting of the Wisconsin Section of the Mathemati- 
cal Association of America at the University of Wisconsin-Eau 
Claire. 
1. Peacock also published a revised version of his Treatise 
on Algebra [1842-18451. However, the present paper is based on 
an analysis of the first edition of the Treatise and the "Re- 
port" of 1833, since Peacock's reputation as one of the earliest 
British proponents of the symbolical approach to algebra rests 
upon these two earlier works. 
2. For a description of the origins and activities of the 
Analytical Society, see Dubbey [1963; 1978, 31-501 and Koppelman 
[1971, 179-1871. 
3. This paper does not explore the question of the possible 
influence of Babbage's unpublished "Philosophy of Analysis" on 
Peacock's algebraic ideas, since at the time of the writing of 
the paper the present author had not seen the relevant unpublished 
manuscript. 
4. The problem of negative numbers was discussed in the 
Transactions of the Royal Society of Edinburgh by William Green- 
field 117881; in the Philosophical Transactions of the Royal So- 
ciety of London by John Playfair [1778], Robert Woodhouse [1801], 
Adrien-Quentin B&e [1806], and Davies Gilbert [1831]; in Charles 
Hutton's Mathematical and Philosophical Dictionary [1795 2, 1471; 
and in algebra textbooks by John Walker [1812, 711 and John 
Bonnycastle [1820 2, 3-41. Unlike Maseres and Frend, these 
authors advocated retention of the negatives. 
5. Nagel has suggested that Woodhouse also deserves some 
credit for laying "the basis for the subsequent development of 
algebra" because of "his penetrating remarks on the nature of 
symbolic reasoning" (in [Woodhouse 18011) [Nagel 1935, 4461. 
6. In an interesting study of the development of British 
symbolical algebra, Koppelman [1971] has argued that the change 
in algebra from emphasizing the meaning or nature of symbols to 
stressing the laws of their combination resulted from the early- 
19th-century work on the calculus of operations by Peacock and 
other leading British mathematicians of the period. Although 
the calculus of operations certainly contributed to the emer- 
gence of the symbolical approach to algebra, the preceding com- 
ments suggest that there were indications of this approach in 
late-18th-century British algebra. 
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7. The imaginary numbers were introduced into symbolical 
al ebra through the assumption of the existence of the sign 
P -1. As Peacock declared: "if therefore the primitive and 
recognized signs of affection be + and - or +1 and -1, consi- 
dered as symbolical multipliers of the symbols or quantities 
they precede, I assume 11/n or (-l)I/n or any other expressions 
which are symbolically equivalent to the, to represent the appro- 
priate signs of affection of the corresponding arithmetical roots 
[Peacock 1830, xxviii]. In the "Report," however, Peacock refer- 
red not only to the independent signs + and -, but also to the 
"quantities . . . -c and +c" [Peacock 1833, 1951. 
8. Peacock's statement of the arbitrariness of the laws of 
symbolical algebra was mentioned, but not explored, by Nagel 
[1935, 454-4551 and Novy [1973, 192-1941. 
9. AS far as I have been able to determine, the revised 
version of Peacock's Treatise on Algebra [1842-18451 does not 
include any statement of the arbitrarines of symbolical laws 
equivalent to those found in the Treatise of 1830 or the "Report" 
of 1833. 
10. For a fairly recent general discussion of the problem 
of meaning in mathematics, see [Birkhoff 1975, esp. 507-521, 
529-5331. 
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